More than two decades after the European Commission first floated the idea of a “Made in Europe” label, the concept has returned to the centre of EU policy debate in a significantly more strategic and politically charged form.
Originally discussed in 2003 as a simple origin mark for products, similar to “Made in USA” or “Made in China”, the proposal faded without implementation. Today, however, it has re-emerged as part of a broader industrial strategy aimed at strengthening Europe’s economic resilience and reducing dependence on foreign suppliers.
At the core of the renewed push is the EU’s concern over the steady erosion of its manufacturing base. In the 1990s, manufacturing accounted for more than 20% of the bloc’s GDP. That figure has since fallen to around 14%, prompting calls for intervention.
A key element of the new approach is the proposed Industrial Accelerator Act, which seeks to reshape public procurement rules across member states. Under current regulations, government contracts must be open to international bidders and awarded primarily on price competitiveness. The proposed changes would allow greater emphasis on environmental standards and, crucially, the geographic origin of products.
If adopted, European firms and goods produced within the EU would be given preference in certain public contracts. Additional measures under consideration include local content thresholds for subsidies and grants, particularly in strategic sectors such as electric vehicles, steel, and renewable energy technologies.
Supporters argue the reforms are necessary to rebuild industrial capacity and secure supply chains after years of global disruption. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed vulnerabilities in international logistics, while Russia’s war in Ukraine highlighted Europe’s reliance on external energy sources. More recently, tensions with the United States have intensified concerns over dependence on foreign technology, defence systems, and financial infrastructure.
The proposal has also drawn strong criticism from trading partners, particularly China. Beijing has objected to provisions that could restrict access to European contracts and require foreign companies to form joint ventures with local firms when investing above €100 million in strategic sectors. Chinese officials argue the measures could violate international trade rules and disrupt established economic ties.
European policymakers, however, maintain that the strategy is about balancing openness with security. They point to China’s own industrial policies, including “Made in China 2025”, as evidence that large economies routinely support domestic industries.
The debate reflects a broader shift in global trade dynamics, where supply chain security and economic sovereignty are increasingly prioritised alongside free-market principles. While some EU member states remain cautious about protectionist risks, momentum is building around a more self-reliant industrial model.
As discussions continue, the “Made in Europe” agenda has evolved from a branding idea into a defining test of how far the European Union is willing to go to reshape its economic future.
